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I. INTRODUCTION
1

The issue in Bode v. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources
was whether a judgment entered by a court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction could be collaterally attacked as void when the issue of
2
jurisdiction had not been litigated in the initial proceeding. The
facts of Bode are straightforward. The Nicollet County Hearings
Unit determined that William Bode’s farm did not contain a
3
wetland. The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR)
4
filed an untimely appeal with the district court, which nevertheless
5
proceeded to enter a judgment on the merits. Mr. Bode did not
participate in the district court proceeding nor did he contest the
6
jurisdiction of the court. When Mr. Bode’s successors in interest,
7
his daughters Judy and Linda Bode, subsequently moved to set
aside the original judgment as void, the district court granted their
8
9
motion. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, and with one
10
justice dissenting, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the
11
decision of the court of appeals.
In Bode, the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with deciding
which was more important given this fact situation – the validity or
the finality of the original judgment. The Bode court chose to adopt

1. 612 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 2000).
2. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 864-65.
3. Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order (Nicollet County Hearings Unit
Sept. 10, 1980); Comm’r of Natural Res. of the State of Minn. v. Nicollet County
Pub. Water/Wetlands Unit, No. 19299 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 5th Dist. Dec. 17, 1986);
Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 864.
4. Prior to August 1, 1983, appeals from agency decisions were made to the
district court. MINN. STAT. § 15.0424, subd. 1 (1980). Since then, appeals are made
to the court of appeals. MINN. STAT. § 14.63 (2000). The Minnesota Court of
Appeals was established by the Court of Appeals Act, ch. 501, 1982 Minn. Laws 569
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 480A.01-.11 (2000)).
5. Comm’r of Natural Res. of the State of Minn. v. Nicollet County Pub.
Water/Wetlands Unit, No. 19299 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 5th Dist. Dec. 17, 1986)
(unpublished opinion, not separately paginated); Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 864.
6. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 864-65.
7. Id. at 864 n.3.
8. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., No. C3-96-100071 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
5th Dist. Aug. 31, 1998); Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 865.
9. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 594 N.W.2d 257, 258 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1999); Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 865.
10. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 871 (Page, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 870.
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12

section 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and its
13
preference for finality instead of adhering to its own precedent
14
which held that validity was of paramount importance. In doing
so, the court (1) implicitly condoned Minnesota courts acting
beyond their express statutory authority, and (2) infringed upon
the authority of the legislature to establish the applicable appeals
period for agency rulings.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Void Judgments at Common Law
The competing notions of finality and validity have long
15
provided a source of friction in the law. At English common law, a
decision’s validity was of much greater importance than its
16
finality. This theory was universally accepted in the United States
17
well into the twentieth century. In its famous 1877 decision of
18
Pennoyer v. Neff, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that a judgment
19
“if void when rendered, will always remain void . . . .” Subsequent
Supreme Court cases, however, established that this strict
requirement of validity does not apply when the issue of
20
jurisdiction was previously litigated. For example, in its 1931
21
decision, Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, the Court held
that a party who had unsuccessfully contested and litigated the
court’s personal jurisdiction could not later collaterally attack the
22
original court’s judgment in another court. In its 1938 decision of
12. Id. at 868.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 cmt. a (1980).
14. See infra Part IV.A-B.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1980). See generally Karen
Nelson Moore, Collateral Attack on Subject Matter Jurisdiction: A Critique of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 534 (1981).
16. The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1612); Elliot v.
Perisol’s Lessee, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340-41 (1828).
17. Moore, supra note 15, at 537-38.
18. 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (holding that presence within the state was the chief,
if not the sole, basis for personal jurisdiction).
19. Id. at 728.
20. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165
(1938); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
21. 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
22. Baldwin, 283 U.S. at 525.
Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who
have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest; and
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23

Stoll v. Gottlieb, the Supreme Court expanded the Baldwin
doctrine, applying res judicata treatment to those situations where
24
subject matter jurisdiction had been previously litigated.
The Supreme Court decided a trio of subject matter
jurisdiction cases in 1940. Two of these decisions were handed
25
down on January 2, 1940: Kalb v. Feuerstein and Chicot County
26
Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank. In Kalb, the Court held that
state courts are deprived of all jurisdiction once federal bankruptcy
27
proceedings have been commenced. Thus, the state court
judgment that had granted foreclosure upon the Kalb’s property
28
could be collaterally attacked. The Court noted that “[t]he
Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to regulate
bankruptcy and under this power Congress can limit that
jurisdiction which courts, State or Federal, can exercise over the
person and property of a debtor who duly invokes the bankruptcy
29
law.” The issue of the state court’s jurisdiction had not been
30
litigated in the state action, but the court stated that this was not a
31
factor in their decision. The Kalb decision suggests that where an

that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the
parties. We see no reason why this doctrine should not apply in every case
where one voluntarily appears, presents his case and is fully heard, and
why he should not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter concluded by
the judgment of the tribunal to which he has submitted his cause.
Id. at 525-26.
23. 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938) (stating that “[a]fter a Federal court has decided
the question of the jurisdiction over the parties as a contested issue, the court in
which the plea of res judicata is made has not the power to inquire again into that
jurisdictional fact.”).
24. Id. at 172.
We see no reason why a court in the absence of an allegation of fraud in
obtaining the judgment, should examine again the question whether the
court making the earlier determination on an actual contest over
jurisdiction between the parties, did have jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the litigation. In this case the order upon the petition to vacate
the confirmation settled the contest over jurisdiction.
Id.
25. 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
26. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
27. Kalb, 308 U.S. at 443.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 439.
30. Id. at 436, 443; Benett Boskey & Robert Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral
Attack: October Term, 1939, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1006, 1019 (1940).
31. Kalb, 308 U.S. at 443-44. “Congress manifested its intention that the issue
of jurisdiction in the foreclosing court need not be contested or even raised by the
distressed farmer-debtor.” Id. at 444.
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act of the legislature has been transgressed, collateral estoppel
32
should not apply.
In Chicot, however, the Court held that collateral estoppel
should apply when the statute pursuant to which a judgment had
33
been rendered was subsequently deemed unconstitutional. At
issue were bonds issued by the Chicot County Drainage District that
34
had been effectively cancelled in a previous proceeding. When
the Supreme Court subsequently declared unconstitutional the
35
statute under which the bonds had been cancelled, two banks
36
sued to recover on the bonds. The Court deemed this action to be
37
an impermissible collateral attack.
The Court quickly noted the limited nature of its holding in
Chicot in another 1940 decision. Justice Reed wrote for the Court in
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. that “[i]n the
Chicot County case no inflexible rule as to collateral objection in
general to judgments was declared . . . No examination was made
of the susceptibility to such objection of numerous groups of
judgments concerning status, extra-territorial action of courts, or
38
strictly jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional facts.”
Some decisions and commentary, however, interpret Chicot
39
much more broadly. One source of this broadening was Justice
White’s 1982 opinion in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
32. Id.; Boskey & Braucher, supra note 30, at 1018-19.
33. Chicot, 308 U.S. at 377-78.
34. Id. at 372-74.
35. Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
36. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter St. Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1940).
37. Id. at 377-378.
38. United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940).
The limited nature of Chicot was also recognized by Justice Marshall in 1973. Gosa
v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 709 n.15 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
More generally, Chicot County is probably most appropriately interpreted
as an early decision concerning the nonretroactive application of a
particular decision, namely, Ashton. Despite the Court’s resort at places to
the rubric of res judicata, the presence of substantial reliance on preexisting law clearly was an important consideration in the Court’s
decision not to allow the intervening decision in Ashton to be used to
collaterally attack the original plan of readjustment.
Id.
39. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 n.9 (1982); In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir.
1998); Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Chicot for the
notion that “federal district court’s erroneous exercise of jurisdiction is not subject
to collateral attack”); Maesch v. Maesch, 761 F. Supp. 584, 586 (S.D. Ind. 1989);
Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before
Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491, 493 (1967).
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Compagnie. This was a personal jurisdiction case, but, in dicta, the
Court wrote in a footnote that “[a] party that has had an opportunity
to litigate the question of subject matter jurisdiction may not,
however, reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an
adverse judgment. It has long been the rule that principles of res
judicata apply to jurisdictional determinations – both subject matter
41
and personal.”
This declaration by the Court is perplexing for two reasons.
First, in addition to citing Chicot, the Court also cited Stoll, a case in
which the issue of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction had been
42
actually litigated in a prior proceeding. Secondly, this dicta failed
to incorporate the doctrine of the Court’s 1963 decision of Durfee v.
43
Duke. The Durfee Court had determined that the relevant inquiry
in a collateral attack action was whether “the jurisdictional issues
had been fully and fairly litigated by the parties and finally
44
determined.”
Durfee began as a Nebraska action for quiet title to land located
45
on the Missouri River. Duke appeared in the Nebraska court and
explicitly contested the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, claiming
46
that the land was not in Nebraska, but rather in Missouri. The
Nebraska court, however, found for Durfee as to both the land’s
47
location and the merits of the underlying quiet title action. The
48
Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.
Instead of petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari,
Duke instead instituted her own quiet title action in Missouri state
49
court. After removal to federal district court based on diversity of
citizenship, the district court held that although it believed that the
land was actually in Missouri, res judicata treatment should be
50
afforded the earlier Nebraska proceedings. The court of appeals
reversed, holding that res judicata was not applicable if indeed the
51
land was actually in Missouri. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

456 U.S. 694 (1982).
Id. at 702 n.9.
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 177 (1938).
375 U.S. 106 (1963).
Id. at 116.
Id. at 107-08.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 108-09.
Id. at 109.
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the court of appeals, holding that because the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction had been previously litigated in Nebraska, issue
52
preclusion applied.
The Durfee Court expressly distinguished its decision from the
53
earlier Chicot decision. The Durfee Court noted that there are
54
numerous exceptions to the “general rule of finality.” The Court
determined that the collateral attack was impermissible based upon
a balancing of the factors listed in the first Restatement of
55
Judgments. Importantly, actual litigation is one of the factors
56
listed therein. Numerous subsequent decisions of the Court have
confirmed the requirement of actual litigation of the subject matter
57
jurisdiction issue in order for collateral estoppel to apply. The
Restatement (Second) of Judgments does not include this
58
important factor, however. Section 12 of this Restatement
replaced the useful balancing test provided by the first Restatement
with a blanket general rule that subject matter jurisdiction cannot
be litigated in a subsequent proceeding unless one of three
59
narrowly defined exceptions exists. This “modern” rule places
52. Id. at 116.
53. Id. at 108 n.4. “This is therefore, not a case in which a party, although
afforded an opportunity to contest subject matter jurisdiction, did not litigate the
issue.” Id.
54. Id. at 114-15.
55. Id. at 114 n.12. Among the factors appropriate to be considered in
determining that collateral attack should be permitted are the following:
the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was clear; the
determination as to jurisdiction depended upon a question of law rather
than of fact; the court was one of limited and not of general jurisdiction;
the question of jurisdiction was not actually litigated; the policy against
the court’s acting beyond its jurisdiction is strong.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942). Because the issue in Durfee was one of full
faith and credit, the Court’s actual citation was to the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 451(2) (Supp. 1948), with a secondary cite to RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942). Durfee, 375 U.S. at 114 n.12. This distinction is only
technical, however, as the factors listed in both Restatements are identical. Compare
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 451(2) with RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10.
56. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGEMENTS § 10 (1942).
57. See Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health
Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 705-06 (1982) (recalling Durfee’s actual litigation
requirement). See also Key v. Wise, 454 U.S. 1103, 1108 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). “Durfee is simply an application of the normal
rules of collateral estoppel to jurisdictional determinations.” Id.
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1980).
59. Id. When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the
judgment precludes the parties from litigating the question of the court’s subject
matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation except if:
The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the court’s
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greater weight on a decision’s finality than on its validity.
It is clear from the Supreme Court’s decisions that a court’s
subject matter jurisdiction cannot be collaterally attacked if the
61
issue was previously litigated. This is due to the well-established
principle that federal courts have the authority to determine their
62
own jurisdiction. It is not clear, however, whether a collateral
attack is permissible in federal court if the jurisdictional issue was
63
not previously litigated.
B. Void Judgments in Minnesota
64

As in the federal court system, subject matter jurisdiction
cannot be conferred upon a Minnesota court by the consent of the
65
66
parties. In its 1973 decision of Lange v. Johnson, the Minnesota
jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of
authority; or allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe
the authority of another tribunal or agency of government; or the
judgment was rendered by a court lacking capability to make an
adequately informed determination of a question concerning its own
jurisdiction and as a matter of procedural fairness the party seeking to
avoid the judgment should have opportunity belatedly to attack the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
Id.
60. Id. § 12 cmt. a.
61. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 116 (1963); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165,
172 (1938).
62. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 377
(1940); Stoll, 305 U.S. at 171-72; Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon
Corp., 624 F.2d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1980).
63. Compare Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 702 and Chicot, 308 U.S. at 378, with Durfee, 375 U.S. at 116 and Kalb
v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 443 (1940). See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 4428, at 271 (1981) (“The res
judicata effects of a judgment entered by a court that lacked subject matter
jurisdiction have not been captured in any rule or clear statement of controlling
policies.”). Confusion in the federal courts notwithstanding, this author contends
that a collateral attack should be permitted in the absence of previous litigation of
the jurisdictional issue. Given that subject matter jurisdiction flows from Article
III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
conferred upon a federal court by consent of the parties. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S.
at 702 n.9 (citing California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972)); Hertz Corp. v. Alamo
Rent-A-Car, Inc., 16 F.3d 1126, 1130-31 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Ins. Corp. of Ir.);
Latin Am. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hi-Lift Marina, Inc., 887 F.2d 1477, 1479 (11th
Cir. 1989); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h). Therefore, absent an express determination by
the court that it does indeed have authority to hear the case or controversy, its
decision should be open to subsequent challenge.
64. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
65. Hemmesch v. Molitor, 328 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Minn. 1983).
66. 295 Minn. 320, 204 N.W.2d 205 (1973).
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Supreme Court held that void judgments must be set aside and
67
could be challenged at any time. For the next quarter century,
these twin principles were almost universally applied by Minnesota
68
courts.
69
In Hengel v. Hyatt, the Minnesota Supreme Court built upon
70
its decision in Lange and its 1924 decision in Pugsley v. Magerfleish
by stating that discretion is not involved when setting aside a void
71
judgment. The Hengel court went so far as to declare that even
meritorious defenses could not be used to allow a void judgment to
72
73
stand; if the judgment is void it must be set aside. These
67. Id. at 323-24, 204 N.W.2d at 208. See also Stadum v. Norman County, 508
N.W.2d 217, 218 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, (Minn. Jan. 7, 1994).
68. See Peterson v. Eishen, 512 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. 1994) (holding that
motion to vacate paternity judgment could be brought at any time); Matson v.
Matson, 310 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 1981) (permitting collateral attack where
jurisdictional issue was not previously litigated); Zions First Nat’l Bank v. World of
Fitness, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1979) (refusing to allow collateral attack
where issue of jurisdiction had been previously litigated); Majestic Inc. v. Berry,
593 N.W.2d 251, 257 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (“Unlike the other time-restricted
provisions of Rule 60.02, a motion to set aside a void judgment under rule
60.02(d) may be brought at any time.”); State v. Nodes, 538 N.W.2d 158, 162
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that guardian’s lack of standing was not a
jurisdictional defect); Messenbourg v. Messenbourg, 538 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that default judgment cannot be construed as void if
party previously consented to personal jurisdiction by his actions).
Although the language of the statute and the rule [60.02] indicate that
motions to vacate void judgments must be made within a reasonable
time, the supreme court has held that there is no time limit for
commencing proceedings to set aside a judgment void for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties. A void judgment
is legally ineffective; it may be vacated by the court which rendered it at
any time, and a void judgment cannot become valid through the passage
of time.
Id. (citing Peterson v. Eishen, 512 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. 1994)). See also S.V.
Mgmt. Co. v. Ellis, 472 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (“since [sic]
appellant never had an opportunity to fully and fairly contest jurisdiction in the
California court, the California judgment may be vacated as void if we determine
the California court never obtained personal jurisdiction”); Bernick v. Caboose
Enters., Inc., 395 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (declaring default
judgment void because state lacked jurisdiction over appellant’s property due to
automatic stay feature of bankruptcy proceeding). But cf. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v.
Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624 F.2d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1980) (distinguishing
between complete lack of jurisdiction and mere error in the exercise of
jurisdiction).
69. 312 Minn. 317, 252 N.W.2d 105 (1977).
70. 161 Minn. 246, 201 N.W. 323 (1924).
71. Hengel, 312 Minn. at 318, 252 N.W.2d at 106; accord Chambers v.
Armontrout, 16 F.3d 257, 260 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Relief from void judgments is not
discretionary.”).
72. Hengel, 312 Minn. at 318, 252 N.W.2d at 106.
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statements indicate a binary approach to judgment validity – either
the judgment is void or it is not. There is no middle ground. This
straightforward approach was followed by the Minnesota Court of
Appeals in its 1993 decision of Midway National Bank of St. Paul v.
74
Bollmeier.
75
In its 1994 decision of Peterson v. Eishen, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reconfirmed two important principles. Citing
Lange’s application of Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 and
76
its 1941 decision of Beede v. Nides Finance Corp., the court noted
that “we have previously held that there is no time limit for
commencing proceedings to set aside a judgment void for lack of
77
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties.” Citing two
78
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals cases, the court noted that void
79
judgments are “legally ineffective” and can “be vacated by the
80
court which rendered it at any time.”
C. District Court Appellate Jurisdiction of Agency Rulings
Presently, persons in Minnesota aggrieved by a decision of a
governmental agency have a right of appeal to the Minnesota Court
81
of Appeals. But prior to August 1, 1983, the right of appeal was to
82
the district court. The district court, however, acquired subject
matter jurisdiction only if an appeal was filed within “30 days after
83
the party receives the final decision and order of the agency.” This
73. Id.
74. 504 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (“A motion to vacate a
judgment for lack of jurisdiction under MINN. R. CIV. P. 60.02(d) involves no
question of discretion.”).
75. 512 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 1994).
76. 209 Minn. 354, 296 N.W. 413 (1941).
77. Peterson, 512 N.W.2d at 341.
78. United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990);
Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughn, 450 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1971). The federal courts’
interpretation of federal rules of civil procedure often provide guidance to state
courts in their interpretation of parallel rules. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60,
69 (Minn. 1997). Minnesota Rule 60.02 is nearly identical to Federal Rule 60(b).
Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 60.02, with FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
79. Peterson, 512 N.W.2d at 341.
80. Id.
81. MINN. STAT. § 14.63 (2000).
82. MINN. STAT. § 15.0424, subd. 1 (1980). See MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (“The
district court has original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases and shall have
appellate jurisdiction as prescribed by law.”).
83. MINN. STAT. § 15.0424, subd. 1 (1980). This 30 day filing requirement was
maintained by the present system of appealing to the court of appeals. MINN. STAT.
§ 14.63.
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30-day statutory appeal period is lengthened to 33 days when the
84
appeal period is initiated by a mailing. In its 1973 decision of Blixt
85
v. Civil Service Board, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the
plain meaning of the appeals statute and declared that “[f]ailure to
both serve and file the petition for review within the time provided
86
by statute deprives the district court of jurisdiction.” In 1976,
three years after Blixt, the court decided Kenzie v. Dalco
87
Corporation. Here the court held that untimely appeals should not
88
be reviewed and that even mitigating circumstances do not give
89
the court the power to extend the time for appeal. In its 1980
90
decision of Flame Bar, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, the court once
again held that the district courts do not have jurisdiction when an
91
appeal is untimely.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has
consistently held (1) that time limits for appeals are jurisdictional
92
and must be strictly construed, and (2) unlike personal
jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or

84. Blixt v. Civil Serv. Bd., 297 Minn. 504, 505, 210 N.W.2d 230, 231 n.2
(1973). “Rules 6.05, 5.02, and 6.01, Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, give in
effect 33 days after the date of mailing in which to serve and file the petition for
review.” Id.
85. 297 Minn. 504, 210 N.W.2d 230 (1973).
86. Id. at 505, 210 N.W.2d at 231 (citing Waters v. Putnam, 289 Minn. 165,
183 N.W.2d 545 (1971); State ex rel. Petschen v. Rigg, 257 Minn. 25, 99 N.W.2d 669
(1959)). See also Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Minn. 1999) (court
should look only to plain meaning where statutory language is clear and
unambiguous). The Illinois Supreme Court has likewise noted that a statutory
scheme conferring jurisdiction upon a court is a departure from common law and
the procedures it establishes must be strictly adhered to. See Fredman Bros.
Furniture Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 486 N.E.2d 893, 896 (Ill. 1985) (holding that
when a state circuit court has special statutory jurisdiction, the prescribed
procedures must be strictly adhered to for the court to have jurisdiction).
87. 309 Minn. 495, 245 N.W.2d 207 (1976).
88. Kenzie, 309 Minn. at 497, 245 N.W.2d at 208 (citing Mocuik v. Svoboda,
253 Minn. 562, 93 N.W.2d 547 (1958)).
89. Id. at 497, 245 N.W.2d at 208 (citing Ulman v. Lutz, 238 Minn. 21, 24, 55
N.W.2d 57, 59 (1952)).
90. 295 N.W.2d 586 (Minn. 1980).
91. Id. at 587.
92. Johnson v. Metro. Med. Ctr., 395 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
See also Flame Bar, 295 N.W.2d at 587 (district court was without jurisdiction when
appeal of liquor license suspension was filed after thirty-three day appeal period
had run); Jesmer Co. v. Wurdemahn-Hjelm Corp., 250 Minn. 485, 488-89, 85
N.W.2d 207, 209 (1957) (holding that state courts do not have power to extend
the time for appeal when appeals period has been specifically established by the
legislature); State v. Scientific Computers, Inc., 384 N.W.2d 560, 561 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (stating that service on attorney general was not valid when statute
specifically required that process be served on agency itself).
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conferred upon a Minnesota court by the consent of the parties.

93

III. BODE: FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
William Bode owned a farm in Nicollet County, Minnesota that
94
he used for both dairy and crop farming. In any given year, he
95
had 16-20 cows that he milked himself every morning. Part of the
land he used for grazing his dairy cattle was sloped in such a way
that rainwater collected during the spring months. This annual
collection of water was temporary in nature, naturally draining by
96
the summer months.
In 1979, the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) classified this lower-lying portion of William Bode’s farm as
97
a public wetland. Mr. Bode filed a timely appeal with the Nicollet
98
County Hearings Unit in August 1980 and a hearing was
99
conducted during that same month. The Hearings Unit
determined in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order dated
93. Arndt v. Minn. Educ. Ass’n, 270 Minn. 489, 490, 134 N.W.2d 136, 137
(1965). “We have held that the limitation of time is so far jurisdictional that the
parties cannot waive the objection or by stipulation clothe this court with authority
to determine a belated appeal.” Id; see also Stadum v. Norman County, 508 N.W.2d
217, 218 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing dismissal when trial court erroneously
determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction); Gummow v.
Gummow, 356 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (“Further, parties may not
waive lack of subject matter jurisdiction and may not consent to a court acting
when it has no subject matter jurisdiction.”).
94. Interview with Judy and Linda Bode, in Nicollet County, Minn. (July 7,
2001) [hereinafter Bode Interview].
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 594 N.W.2d 257, 258 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1999). In both 1976 and 1979 the Minnesota Legislature mandated an
inventory of the State’s public waters and wetlands and delegated responsibility for
the identification of these bodies to the Department of Natural Resources. MINN.
STAT. § 105.39 (1979) and related statutes (subsequently recodified at MINN. STAT.
§ 103G.201 (2000)). The definition of wetland was codified at MINN. STAT. §
105.37, subd. 15 (1979) (subsequently recodified at MINN. STAT. § 103G.005, subd
18 (2000)).
98. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 612 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn. 2000).
The Hearings Unit was created by the Minnesota Legislature to resolve wetland
classification disputes. MINN. STAT. § 105.391, subd. 1 (Supp. 1979).
99. Comm’r of Natural Res. of the State of Minn. v. Nicollet County Pub.
Water/Wetlands Unit, No. 19299 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 5th Dist. Dec. 17, 1986)
(unpublished opinion, not separately paginated).
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September 10, 1980, that classification of the disputed portion of
100
Mr. Bode’s farm as wetland had been improper. Specifically, the
Hearings Unit found that there were actually two individual water
basins, one on Mr. Bode’s farm and one on the farm of his
101
neighbor, Gerhard Mertesdorf. Since neither water basin was
greater than ten acres in size, the Hearings Unit declared that the
102
DNR did not have jurisdiction of the land.
The Hearings Unit order was mailed to the DNR on October
103
1, 1980. The DNR filed its Petition for Judicial Review with the
Clerk of the Fifth District Court (Nicollet County) on November 4,
104
1980. The DNR’s appeal was therefore untimely, having been
105
filed 34 days after the DNR had been served. Neither party was
aware that the appeal was untimely and Mr. Bode did not contest
106
the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Although the DNR
filed its notice of appeal with the District Court on November 4,
1980, the case did not come before the District Court until nearly
107
six years later, on June 2, 1986.
In 1981, Mr. Bode, approaching retirement, decided to sell his
108
dairy cattle. His intention was to convert the grazing land to crop
109
land and rent it to another local farmer. Relying on the order of
110
the Hearings Unit and other local officials, Mr. Bode installed a
100. Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order (Nicollet County Hearings Unit
Sept. 10, 1980); Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 864. The Hearings Unit was composed of
three members: one appointed by the Commissioner of the Minnesota
Department of Natural Resources (DNR), one appointed by the County
Commissioners and one board member of the local soil and water conservation
district. Brief for Respondent at 1, Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 594
N.W.2d 257, 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (No. C1-98-2200). The Commissioner of
the DNR appointed Paul Hansen, a DNR employee, to the Hearings Unit. Id.
101. Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order (Nicollet County Hearings Unit
Sept. 10, 1980); Comm’r of Natural Res. of the State of Minn., No. 19299 (unpublished
opinion, not separately paginated).
102. MINN. STAT. § 105.37, subd. 15 (1979); Comm’r of Natural Res. of the State of
Minn., No. 19299 (unpublished opinion, not separately paginated).
103. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., No. C3-96-100071 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
5th Dist. Aug. 31, 1998); Bode, 594 N.W.2d at 258.
104. Bode, 594 N.W.2d at 258.
105. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., No. C3-96-100071 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
5th Dist. Aug. 31, 1998).
106. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 612 N.W.2d 862, 864-865 (Minn.
2000).
107. Comm’r of Natural Res. of the State of Minn., No. 19299 (unpublished
opinion, not separately paginated).
108. Bode Interview, supra note 94.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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drainage tile system that would drain the water which collected in
111
small amounts during the spring rainy season.
B. District Court
Mr. Bode was not represented by counsel at the 1986 hearing,
112
nor did he personally appear. In an order dated December 17,
1986, District Court Judge Rosenbloom overruled the Hearing
113
Unit’s finding. Judge Rosenbloom found that the land met the
statutory definition of “wetland,” but determined that the testimony
114
as to wetland’s size was inconclusive. He determined that the
Mertesdorf wetland was greater than ten acres, but held that if the
Bode wetland was (1) separate from the Mertesdorf wetland and
(2) less than ten acres, then it should not be inventoried. Judge
Rosenbloom ordered a “more precise adjustment of actual
geographic boundaries by further appropriate proceedings
according to law or agreement between Petitioner (the DNR) and
115
the objecting landowners affected hereby.”
The matter was not remanded to the Hearings Unit. Thus,
Judge Rosenbloom’s order was basically a directive to the parties to
go work out their own dispute. Unfortunately, no such agreement
came about. Instead of approaching Mr. Bode in an attempt to
resolve the matter, the DNR issued an administrative order
declaring the “wetland” to be within their jurisdiction and ordering
116
Mr. Bode to restore it. After issuing its order, the DNR returned
111. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 867; Bode Interview, supra note 94.
112. Comm’r of Natural Res. of the State of Minn. v. Nicollet County Pub.
Water/Wetlands Unit, No. 19299 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 5th Dist. Dec. 17, 1986)
(unpublished opinion, not separately paginated). The author is grateful to Mr.
Brain Bates, the Bodes’ current attorney, for supplying copies of the district court
opinions and the attorneys’ briefs from the subsequent appeals.
113. Id.
114. Id.
It is necessary that the area of wetland 52-26 be more precisely and
accurately determined. Conceivably the most southerly “pothole” within
the thirty-six acres which has been designated (the pasture described by
objector Bode as muddy) is not itself 10 acres or more in size. If wholly
separated from the wetland area to the north by lands on which the
dominant vegetation is not aquatic in character, then the southerly
pothole and its contiguous area should not be included in the wetland
designation.
Id.
115. Id.
116. Brief for Appellant at 4, Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 612 N.W.2d
862 (Minn. 2000) (No. C1-98-2200).
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to court, moving for and receiving an Order to enforce restoration
of the wetland in October 1991. On May 7, 1992, and November
22, 1993, the DNR went onto the Bode farm and smashed the drain
117
tile Mr. Bode had installed in 1981.
C. District Court Revisited
Subsequent separate litigation ensued and in July 1998, Judy
and Linda Bode brought a Rule 60.02(d) motion in district court
118
to vacate the 1986 judgment. This motion was brought in the
same court – the fifth judicial district – where the 1986 judgment
119
had been entered.
The Bodes’ Rule 60.02(d) motion was
straightforward: because the DNR’s appeal was untimely, the court
120
never had subject matter jurisdiction and its judgment was void.
121
A hearing was held on August 11, 1998. District Court Judge
Smith found the December 17, 1986 order to be void for want of
122
subject matter jurisdiction and vacated the order.
In his opinion, Judge Smith noted that Mr. Bode did not
appear at the hearing and that neither the parties that were
123
present, nor the court, had raised the jurisdictional defect. Judge
Smith applied the plain meaning of Minnesota Statutes section
15.0424 and the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that
the district court was without jurisdiction because the DNR had not
appealed the Hearing Unit’s ruling within thirty-three days after
124
the ruling had been mailed to the DNR.
Judge Smith’s
125
on
straightforward jurisdictional analysis expressly relied
numerous previous decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court
126
which had strictly construed the applicable appeals periods.
117. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 865.
118. Id. The Bode sisters had received title to the Bode farm in 1986, subject to
a life estate in their parents. Id. at 864 n.3. Mr. Bode passed away on September 1,
1993. Id.
119. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., No. C3-96-100071 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
5th Dist. Aug. 31, 1998).
120. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 865.
121. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., No. C3-96-100071 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
5th Dist. Aug. 31, 1998).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Flame Bar, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 295 N.W.2d 586, 587 (Minn. 1980);
Kenzie v. Dalco Corp., 309 Minn. 495, 245 N.W.2d 207 (1976); Blixt v. Civil Serv.
Bd., 297 Minn. 504, 505, 210 N.W.2d 230, 231 (1973) (citing Waters v. Putnam,
289 Minn. 165, 183 N.W.2d 545 (1971); State ex rel. Petschen v. Rigg, 257 Minn. 25,
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Noting that “[t]he language in Minnesota cases seems to leave
very little if no discretion on this issue,” Judge Smith held that
because the Rosenbloom court had lacked subject matter
127
jurisdiction, its judgment was void. Judge Smith correctly noted
128
that Peterson v. Eishen established that there is no time limit for
moving to have a judgment set-aside based on lack of subject
129
matter discretion.
But importantly, Judge Smith denied the
Bodes the relief they were seeking for the damage the DNR did to
130
their drain tile. He reasoned that the DNR should not be held
liable because they had in good faith relied upon a valid court
131
order.
D. Court of Appeals
Unfortunately, Judge Smith’s straightforward and wellresearched decision was not upheld by the Minnesota Court of
132
Appeals. In an opinion authored by Judge Lansing, the court of
appeals reversed Judge Smith’s order and reinstated Judge
133
Rosenbloom’s order. The court of appeals concurred with the
134
district court’s conclusion that the DNR’s appeal was untimely.
But the court then applied a “quasi-jurisdictional approach,”
attempting to distinguish between the “procedural exercise of
jurisdiction” and “subject-matter jurisdiction in its strict
135
application.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, had
rejected this type of quasi-jurisdictional approach in its 1965
136
decision of Arndt v. Minnesota Education Association. Furthermore,
a plain reading of Minnesota Statutes section 15.0424, subdivision

99 N.W.2d 669 (1959)).
127. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., No. C3-96-100071 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
5th Dist. Aug. 31, 1998).
128. 512 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 1994).
129. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., No. C3-96-100071 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
5th Dist. Aug. 31, 1998).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 594 N.W.2d 257 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 261.
135. Bode, 594 N.W.2d at 260.
136. 270 Minn. 489, 490, 134 N.W.2d 136, 137 (1965). “It is well established by
the decisions of this court that the statutory limitation of time within which an
appeal may be taken from an appealable order or from a judgment is
jurisdictional.” Id.
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1, establishes that it is the procedural exercise of a timely appeal that
137
confers subject matter jurisdiction on the district court. In the absence
of a timely appeal—a procedure—the district court never had
138
subject matter jurisdiction of the appeal.
The court of appeals cited three cases to support its
proposition that the Minnesota Supreme Court had previously
139
recognized “exceptions to the voidness doctrine.” None of the
cases cited, however, involved a subsequent challenge based on an
140
alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The first case cited was
141
Zions First National Bank v. World of Fitness, Inc. The issue in that
case was an alleged lack of personal jurisdiction due to faulty service
142
The party that sought to set aside the default
of process.
judgment which had been entered against him had previously
moved to quash the return of service and his motion had been
143
denied. Therefore, the issue of personal jurisdiction had been
placed squarely in front of the court and the court determined that
144
it did in fact have personal jurisdiction of the party.
The other two cases cited by the Court of Appeals did not
involve a jurisdictional dispute, either subject matter or personal,
and thus cannot be characterized as attempts to set aside void
145
judgments. The second case cited in support of the voidness
146
doctrine was Dorso Trailer Sales, Inc. v. American Body & Trailer, Inc.
The issue there was whether Dorso Trailer (hereinafter Dorso)
could be released from a judgment when opposing counsel did not
disclose the existence of a statute which, barring a constitutional
challenge, would have governed the suit and led to a judgment in
147
favor of Dorso. The motion to vacate was based upon Minnesota
148
Rules of Civil Procedure 60.02(a)(c) and (f), not (d). Therefore,
137. MINN. STAT. § 15.0424, subd. 1 (1980).
138. Blixt v. Civil Serv. Bd., 297 Minn. 504, 505, 210 N.W.2d 230, 231 (1973)
(citing Waters v. Putnam, 289 Minn. 165, 183 N.W.2d 545 (1971); State ex rel.
Petschen v. Rigg, 257 Minn. 25, 99 N.W.2d 669 (1959)).
139. Bode, 594 N.W.2d at 262.
140. See Dorso Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Am. Body & Trailer, Inc., 482 N.W.2d 771
(Minn. 1992); Zions First Nat’l Bank v. World of Fitness, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 22
(Minn. 1979); Murray v. Walter, 269 N.W.2d 47 (Minn. 1978).
141. 280 N.W.2d 22 (Minn. 1979).
142. Id. at 23.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See generally Dorso, 482 N.W.2d 771; Murray, 269 N.W.2d 47.
146. 482 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1992).
147. Id. at 772-73.
148. Id. at 772.
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the Bode Court of Appeals misstated the rule of Dorso when it wrote
in a parenthetical that a “court’s failure to consider provision in
statute that prevented recovery did not void action when appellant
149
had a full and fair opportunity to raise the statute but did not.”
The Dorso court never alleged that the initial judgment was void,
but instead held that the judgment was based on either mistake or
150
fraud upon the court. Dorso is further distinguished from Bode in
that although Dorso had not discovered the existence of the
governing statute itself, it actively participated in the initial
proceeding and therefore had a “full and fair opportunity” to
151
introduce the statute.
152
Applying the rule of the third case cited, Murray v. Walter, to
the facts of Bode was rather strained. Unlike in Bode, the statutory
provisions at issue in Murray were not limitations on the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction, but rather were expressly held to be
threshold requirements which were required to be pled and proved
in order to recover under Minnesota’s No-Fault Automobile
153
Insurance Act.
The court of appeals based its decision in part upon the
notion that Mr. Bode “had a full and fair opportunity to raise the
procedural deficiency of the notice of appeal before or during the
hearing on the merits . . . In the 1986 appeal [by the DNR] that
resulted in the challenged judgment, Bode was a named party and
154
an attorney entered an appearance on his behalf.”
However, this assertion while factually correct, is grossly
misleading. It is undisputed that Mr. Bode himself did not appear.
What actually transpired is the following. The law firm of Kunard
and Kakeldey represented William Bode at the Nicollet County
155
Hearings Unit hearing in 1980. After the DNR filed its Notice of
Appeal on November 4, 1980, that law firm filed a notice of
156
appearance dated November 4, 1980.
The law firm’s
157
representation was withdrawn six months later on May 13, 1981.

149. Bode, 594 N.W.2d at 262.
150. Dorso, 482 N.W.2d at 772.
151. Id. at 772, 774.
152. 269 N.W.2d 47, 48 (Minn. 1978).
153. Id. at 48. See MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41-65B.71 (2000).
154. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 594 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1999).
155. Bode Interview, supra note 94.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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After May 13, 1981, Mr. Bode was never again represented by
counsel nor did he participate in any way in the subsequent
158
proceedings.
This accurate version of events calls into serious question the
Court of Appeals perception that “William Bode had ample
opportunity to challenge the lateness of DNR’s appeal at that
159
time.” Mr. Bode was in poor health in 1986 and suffered a stroke
160
shortly after he was made aware of Judge Rosenbloom’s order.
Since Mr. Bode did not appear either personally or via counsel at
the 1986 hearing, Judge Rosenbloom’s 1986 order could be
likened to a default judgment. Some would argue that the district
court proceeding was in effect a continuation of the Hearings Unit
proceedings that Mr. Bode had participated in. But such a
simplistic approach would ignore the fact that the district court had
161
not acquired jurisdiction because the appeal was not timely filed.
The overriding fact remains, however, that the court of appeals
ignored the district court’s right to vacate its own void judgment at
162
any time.
IV. THE BODE DECISION
A. Procedural Aspects
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals
163
decision. At the outset of its opinion, the court concluded that
164
the Bodes’ Rule 60.02(d) motion was procedurally deficient. The
court reasoned that because the Bodes’ challenge of the 1986
decision was made in a different proceeding, their attack was
165
technically collateral in nature. The supreme court then stated
166
that Rule 60.02(d) may only be used for direct attacks. The court
of appeals, however, had not allowed itself to get hung up on this
158. Id.
159. Bode, 594 N.W.2d at 263.
160. Bode Interview, supra note 94.
161. If the use of quasi-judicial agency proceedings is ever to achieve the
presumed goal of relieving congestion in the district courts, their decisions must
be respected and regarded as final when an appeal is not taken within the
prescribed period.
162. Peterson v. Eishen, 512 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. 1994).
163. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 612 N.W.2d 862, 870 (Minn. 2000).
164. Id. at 866.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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167

technicality and the supreme court itself had previously stated
168
In fact, the
that Rule 60(b) nomenclature is unimportant.
distinction between direct and collateral attacks is one of the most
169
obscure areas of procedural law. It is ironic that the supreme
court strictly construed the function of Rule 60.02, but as discussed
below, the court did not feel compelled to strictly construe the
language of the appeals period statute.
Regardless of the court’s Rule 60.02(d) interpretation, the fact
170
remained that the DNR’s appeal was not timely filed,
and
171
therefore the district court’s 1986 decision was void.
It is
irrelevant how the existence of the void judgment came before the
172
district court in 1998. Instead of focusing on perceived technical

167. Bode, 594 N.W.2d at 261-62 (“Although the Bodes’ rule 60.02 motion did
not have the same name or file number as the original action, specific
nomenclature is not essential because relief from a judgment is available either by
motion or through filing a separate action.”).
168. Eliseuson v. Frayseth, 290 Minn. 282, 287, 187 N.W.2d 685, 688 (1971).
The court noted:
It remains clear, as it has from the beginning, that Rule 60(b) does not
limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action. And since
nomenclature is unimportant a proceeding for relief under 60(b) may in
an appropriate case be treated as an independent action; and similarly an
independent action may be treated as a proceeding under 60(b).
Id. (quoting 7 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.31 (2d ed. 1948)).
169. Note, The Value of the Distinction Between Direct and Collateral Attacks on
Judgments, 66 YALE L.J. 526, 526 (1957).
170. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., No. C3-96-100071 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
5th Dist. Aug. 31, 1998) (“The evidence is convincing that DNR’s petition was
untimely. The petition was filed more than 33 days after the mailing which
determined the starting date for the appeal period.”); Bode, 594 N.W.2d at 261
(“Applying [the rules of civil procedure], the district court found that DNR’s filing
on November 4, 1980, 34 days after October 1, 1980, was one day late. The record
supports the district court’s finding that the appeal was improperly taken after the
expiration of the appeal period.”); Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 864 (“The Bodes now
contend that this appeal was filed one day late and the DNR does not contest this
point.”).
171. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., No. C3-96-100071 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
5th Dist. Aug. 31, 1998); Lange v. Johnson, 295 Minn. 320, 324, 204 N.W.2d 205,
208 (1973).
172. See Freeland v. Pfeiffer, 621 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). “[T]he
authority to vacate a void judgment is not derived from Civ. R. 60(B), but rather
constitutes an inherent power possessed by Ohio courts.” Id. (citing Patton v.
Diemer, 518 N.E.2d 941, 944 (Ohio 1988)). “It was neither incumbent upon
appellee to establish a basis for relief under Civ.R. 60(B) nor was it necessary for
the common pleas court to derive its authority therefrom. Rather, the ‘judgment’
sought to be vacated constituted a nullity.” Id. (citing Patton, 518 N.E.2d at 944).
Compare Ohio Civ. R. 60(B) with Minn. R. 60.02.
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173

requirements, the court should have recognized the lack of
174
subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.
The court further concluded that the Bodes’ action also failed
175
on the merits. First, the court chose to apply the “modern”
validity of judgments rule, as articulated in section 12 of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, instead of the traditional
176
rule. Second, the court concluded that the Bodes’ collateral
177
attack was not brought within a reasonable time.
B. Restatement Adoption
The adoption of section 12 by the Minnesota Supreme Court

173. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 866.
174. Sua sponte is a Latin term meaning “of one’s own accord; voluntarily,
[w]ithout prompting or suggestion.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1437 (7th ed. 1999).
The federal courts have a strong tradition of ensuring they have jurisdiction of a
case before proceeding to the merits. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (subject matter jurisdiction is of
such importance that at each level of appellate review, the court should inquire on
its own as to whether it has the authority to hear the case); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 740 (1976) (“Though neither party has questioned the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to entertain the appeal, we are obligated to do
so on our own motion if a question thereto exists.”) (citing Mansfield, Coldwater
& Lake Mich. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884)). The Mansfield Court’s words
prove very instructive:
[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of
the United States, is inflexible and without exception, which requires this
court, of its own motion, to deny its own jurisdiction . . . . On every writ of
error or appeal the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction,
first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes.
Mansfield, 111 U.S. at 382. See also Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (“[I]t is the duty of this court to see to it that the jurisdiction
of the circuit court, which is defined and limited by statute, is not exceeded. This
duty we have frequently performed of our own motion.”) (citing Mansfield, 111
U.S. at 382); United States v. County of Cook, Ill., 167 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 1999).
“No court may decide a case without subject-matter jurisdiction, and neither the
parties nor their lawyers may stipulate to jurisdiction or waive arguments that the
court lacks jurisdiction. If the parties neglect the subject, a court must raise
jurisdictional questions itself.” Id. at 387 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988); Indiana Gas. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141
F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1998)).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has on several occasions recognized
sua sponte its lack of appellate jurisdiction because of the untimely filing of appeals.
See, e.g., Fox v. Brewer, 620 F.2d 177, 179 (8th Cir. 1980); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Kurtenbach, 525 F.2d 1179, 1181-82 (8th Cir. 1975);
United States v. June, 503 F.2d 442, 444-45 (8th Cir. 1974).
175. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 866.
176. Id. at 868.
177. Id. at 870.
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was both unnecessary and unwise. The court did not need to look
beyond its own precedent when determining the treatment that
178
Even if the court
should be afforded a void judgment.
determined its own precedent was not applicable, the balancing
test provided by section 10 of the original Restatement of
Judgments would have adequately resolved the issue presented in
179
Bode. First, the district court, while normally a court of general
jurisdiction, was a court of limited jurisdiction when acting in an
180
appellate capacity. Second, the facts conclusively indicated that
Mr. Bode never litigated the issue of the district court’s
181
jurisdiction. Third, the policy against the court’s acting beyond
182
its jurisdiction could not have been much stronger.
The
Rosenbloom court had effectively deprived Mr. Bode of the use of a
portion of his farm based on a hearing (1) that took place more
183
than six years after the Hearings Unit had ruled in his favor and
(2) that he did not participate in.
The court, however, reasoned that because the DNR had
relied on the 1986 judgment, application of the modern rule

178. See Lange v. Johnson, 295 Minn. 320, 323-24, 204 N.W.2d 205, 208 (1973).
The Bode court cited Lange in its decision but chose not to follow it. Bode, 612
N.W.2d at 866-68; see also Peterson v. Eishen, 512 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. 1994).
The Restatements and the rules contained therein do not represent primary
authority in Minnesota. Williamson v. Guentzel, 584 N.W.2d 20, 24-25 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1998) (citing Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Minn.
1984)).
179. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942). It must be noted here that the
first Restatements restated the then existing law and thus lived up to their name
and billing. The second Restatements, however, reflect the view of what the
reporters thought the law should be rather than what the law really was. W. Noel
Keyes, The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality and a Proposal for its
Amelioration, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 23, 24 (1985); Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the
Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147 ( 1969) (suggesting that the American Law Institute
should continue to declare rules as to how courts should decide as opposed to
merely stating what existing law is); Memorandum of the Defense Research Institute’s
American Law Institute Committee Regarding the Restatements of the Law, 9 FOR THE
DEFENSE NO. 5 (May, 1968) (pointing out that the Restatements (Second) contain
what the members of the American Law Institute think the law should be rather
than what the established law is).
180. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 3; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10 (c).
181. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., No. C3-96-100071 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
5th Dist. Aug. 31, 1998); Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 864-65; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §
10 (d).
182. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10 (e).
183. Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order (Nicollet County Hearings Unit
Sept. 10, 1980).

09CASENOTE.DOC

2002]

3/4/2002 1:26 PM

CIVIL PROCEDURE: BODE V. MINN. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES.

1239

184

favoring judgment finality was preferable.
In support of its
adoption of section 12, the court did not cite to a single Minnesota
185
case. Rather, the court cited to eleven decisions from other
186
jurisdictions.
Only five of these decisions expressly adopted
187
section 12. In the other six cases the decisions either stopped
188
short of adopting section 12 or were significantly different from
Bode in that the question of jurisdiction had been previously
189
litigated.
184. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 867-68.
Prior to the 1986 judgment, William Bode installed a tile drainage system
within the tract designated by the DNR as wetlands. Relying on the
judgment, the DNR issued a restoration order in 1989 requiring the
Bodes to remove that drainage system. When the Bodes did not comply,
the DNR obtained a default judgment to enforce the order. When the
Bodes still did not comply, the court held them in contempt and issued
an order authorizing the DNR to restore the wetlands. In 1992 and 1993,
the DNR forcibly went onto the Bode farm to destroy the tile drainage
system.
Id.
185. Id. at 866-68.
186. Id. at 867 n.5.
187. See Meinket v. Levinson, 474 A.2d 454, 456 (Conn. 1984) (holding that
trial court had competence to entertain a foreclosure action and thus did not lack
subject matter jurisdiction); Ervey v. Northeastern Log Homes, Inc., 638 A.2d 709,
711 (Me. 1994) (overturning decision by Worker’s Compensation Board which
had nullified decree of Worker’s Compensation Commission, holding that
Commission’s decision was valid and thus beyond attack). See also In re B.C., 726
A.2d 45, 51 (Vt. 1999); In re Marriage of Brown, 653 P.2d 602, 603-04 (Wash.
1982); In re H.N.T., 371 N.W.2d 395, 397-98 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
188. See O’Leary v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1062, 1066 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that since issue of whether section 303(a) of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act exempted insurer from an underinsured motorist claim had
been previously litigated in suit to compel arbitration, relitigation of that same
issue was precluded by collateral estoppel in subsequent suit based on underlying
claim); Simmons v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 844 F.2d 517, 520 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding that court’s assumption of jurisdiction in Gerson v. Diamond Shamrock
Corp., 710 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) was not a manifest abuse of authority
and thus not subject to collateral attack); McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465,
1487 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the second exception to section 12 applied to
the assertion of jurisdiction by the Washington court); In re Marriage of Mitchell,
692 N.E.2d 281, 285 (Ill. 1998) (holding that erroneous child support judgment
was voidable, not void, and therefore not subject to collateral attack).
189. See Crossroads Cogeneration Corp. v. Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc.,
969 F. Supp. 907, 918 (D.N.J. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, Crossroads
Cogeneration Corp. v. Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 159 F.3d 129 (3d Cir.
1998) (holding that New York Public Service Commission’s declaratory ruling in
prior proceeding barred producer from relitigating issue of Commission’s subject
matter jurisdiction when issue had been fully and fairly litigated before the
NYPSC, and when the NYPSC expressly determined that it did have jurisdiction);
Wall v. Stinson, 983 P.2d 736, 743 (Alaska 1999) (holding that determination by
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Four of the decisions cited by the Minnesota Supreme Court
did not formally adopt section 12. In its decision, In re Marriage of
190
Mitchell, the Illinois Supreme Court expressly stopped short of
191
adopting section 12 of the Restatement. That court wrote “[t]he
parties do not ask us to adopt the rule expressed in the
Restatement, however, and therefore we need not decide in this
192
case whether to take that step.” Additionally, the issue in Mitchell
193
was not subject matter jurisdiction, but statutory interpretation.
194
In McDougald v. Jenson, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
195
Circuit did not expressly adopt section 12 but merely noted that
the Washington Supreme Court had “approved [that] test for
196
determining when such a collateral attack may be entertained.”
197
In both O’Leary v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. and Simmons v.
198
Diamond Shamrock Corp., the courts’ discussions of section 12 were
199
obiter dictum and not central to the decisions. In the last two cases,
200
Crossroads Cogeneration Corp. v. Orange & Rockland Utilities and Wall
201
202
v. Stinson, the respective courts adopted section 12, but in both
cases the question of jurisdiction had been previously fully and
203
fairly litigated.
Oregon that it had personal jurisdiction was entitled to full faith and credit).
190. 692 N.E.2d 281 (Ill. 1998).
191. Id. at 285.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 284. “The judge had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject
matter, and, although the judgment was erroneous, the judge had the authority to
enter the child support order.” Id.
194. 786 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1986).
195. Id. at 1487.
196. Id. at n.12.
197. 923 F.2d 1062 (3d Cir. 1991).
198. 844 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1988).
199. O’Leary, 923 F.2d at 1066 n.5; Simmons, 844 F.2d at 520 n.4.
200. 969 F. Supp. 907 (D.N.J. 1997).
201. 983 P.2d 736 (Alaska 1999).
202. Crossroads, 969 F. Supp. at 918-19; Wall, 983 P.2d at 742.
203. Crossroads, 969 F. Supp. at 918; Wall, 983 P.2d at 741. “In the instant case,
plaintiff fully and fairly litigated the issue of the NYPSC’s jurisdiction over the
dispute between the parties in the proceedings before the NYPSC, and the NYPSC
expressly determined that it did, in fact, have jurisdiction to render a decision.”
Crossroads, 969 F. Supp. at 918. “Wall vigorously litigated personal jurisdiction in
the Oregon Court, and the Oregon Court decided against him.” Wall, 983 P.2d at
741. The Wall Court noted that section 97 of Second Restatement of Conflict of
Laws states that collateral attack for want of personal or subject matter jurisdiction
is limited to situations in which the issue was not actually litigated in the first
tribunal. Id. at 742 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 97, 10506 (1971)).
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C. Restatement Misapplication
After adopting the modern rule, the supreme court failed in
three respects to apply it properly. First, the very first sentence of
section 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments requires a
204
contested action.
As previously discussed, Mr. Bode neither
personally appeared nor was represented by counsel during the
1986 hearing. These facts were omitted from the court’s decision
even though they were included in two different locations in the
205
Bodes’ appellants brief. Assuming that the supreme court did not
ignore the facts, the court was misled by the court of appeals’
recitation of Mr. Bode’s participation and/or failed to recognize
the significance of Mr. Bode’s non-participation when reviewing
the brief.
Secondly, even if the court implicitly assumed that the 1986
hearing was a contested action, two of the exceptions to section 12
206
applied. First, as Justice Page pointed out in his dissent, the first
exception of section 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
applied because “[a]n untimely appeal is ‘so plainly beyond the
[district] court’s jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a
207
manifest abuse of authority.’” Secondly, the second exception to
section 12 was also met. Allowing the decision to stand
“substantially infringe[d] the authority of another . . . agency of
208
government.” In Minnesota, a district court’s jurisdiction to act in
209
an appellate capacity flows from the Legislature. Only that body
210
has the power to determine the length of an appeals period.
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1980). “When a court has
rendered judgment in a contested action, the judgment precludes the parties
from litigating the question of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . .” Id.
205. Brief for Appellants at 4, 21, Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 612
N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 2000) (No. C1-98-2200).
206. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 871 (Page, J., dissenting).
207. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12).
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12(2). See generally MINN. CONST.
art. III, § 1. “The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct
departments: legislative, executive and judicial. No person or persons belonging to
or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly
belonging to either of the others except in the instances expressly provided in this
constitution.” Id. See also Arndt v. Minn. Educ. Ass’n, 270 Minn. 489, 491, 134
N.W.2d 136, 138 (1965); McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1487 n.12 (11th
Cir. 1986)(holding that the second exception to section 12 applied as the
assertion of jurisdiction by the Washington court infringed the authority of the
Florida court).
209. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
210. Id. Arndt, 270 Minn. at 491, 134 N.W.2d at 138. The court stated:
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D. The Reasonable Time Requirement of Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 60.02
The court noted that Rule 60.02 “provides that a motion to
211
vacate a void judgment ‘shall be made within a reasonable time.’”
The court then noted that despite the language of Rule 60.02, it
had not previously applied any time limits to motions to vacate a
212
judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. But the court
nonetheless decided to apply the reasonable time limit
requirement of Rule 60.02 to the Bodes’ attack on the district
213
court’s subject matter jurisdiction of the DNR’s 1980 appeal.
Having decided to apply a “reasonable time” limit, the court then
adopted the definition of “reasonable time” from its previous
214
215
216
decisions of Sommers v. Thomas and Newman v. Fjelstad - two
In cases of this nature this court is subservient to the legislative power.
The legislature fixes the time in which an appeal must be perfected.
Unless the prescribed statutory period is complied with, this court loses
jurisdiction and nothing is left to the exercise of its discretion after time
for appeal has expired. We have no choice but to dismiss the present
appeal . . . .
Id. The Minnesota Constitution expressly provides for the separation of powers
between branches of government. MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1. “No person or
persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any
of the powers properly belonging to either of the others except in the instances
expressly provided in this constitution.” Id. The bedrock principle of our
democracy is that we are a self-governing people - those who make the laws we live
under are directly accountable to us via free and fair elections. The function of a
state court is to interpret its state’s constitution and statutes. Courts do not “make”
law, legislatures do. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 4 (1990) (“The intended function of the federal courts is
to apply the law as it comes to them from the hands of others.”). Judge Bork was
discussing the federal judiciary, but the same principle applies to state courts as
well. When the legislature’s intent is unambiguous, the statutory language is
authoritative and binding on the court. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton). “It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a
repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of
the legislature.” Id.
211. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 869 (quoting MINN. R. CIV. P. 60.02).
212. Id. See Lange v. Johnson, 295 Minn. 320, 323-24, 204 N.W.2d 205. 208
(1973); see also Peterson v. Eishen, 512 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn 1994) (stating
motion to vacate paternity judgment could be brought at any time).
213. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 870.
214. Id.
215. 251 Minn. 461, 467, 88 N.W.2d 191, 195-96 (1958). “What constitutes a
reasonable time varies from case to case and must be determined in each instance
from the facts before the court because the very nature of the exercise of
discretionary power in cases of this kind is such as to prevent any absolute rule
being laid down.” Id. But note that Sommers dealt with a default judgment, a
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cases where subject matter jurisdiction was not at issue. In
choosing to apply a reasonable time limit, the court ignored the
body of persuasive authority that suggests that there is no time limit
218
for challenging a void judgment.
Once the court decided to apply a reasonable time
requirement, the court focused exclusively on reliance by the
219
DNR. In doing so the court ignored two important facts. First, the
court ignored the fact that Judge Smith held the DNR harmless for
destroying Mr. Bode’s drain tile, as they were relying on what was
220
then perceived to be a valid court order. Second, the court
ignored the fact that in the six years between the Hearings Unit’s
ruling in their favor, and the district court’s judgment in favor of
the DNR, Mr. Bode significantly relied on the ruling of the
221
Hearings Unit. Specifically, Mr. Bode installed a drainage system
222
on his land to make the land farmable. The combination of Mr.
Bode’s ownership of the land, a Hearings Unit ruling in his favor,
and a six-year duration between the Hearings Unit ruling in 1980
and Judge Rosenbloom’s order in 1986, result in a stronger
reliance argument for Mr. Bode than for the DNR. Tragically, the
personal jurisdiction issue, and not a subject matter jurisdiction issue. Id. at 462,
88 N.W.2d at 192.
216. 271 Minn. 514, 522, 137 N.W.2d 181, 186 (1965). “Since what is a
reasonable time must be determined in light of all attendant circumstances,
intervening rights, loss of proof by or prejudice to the adverse party, the
commanding equities of the case, the general desirability that judgments be final
and other relevant factors bear upon the problem.” Id. (quoting 7 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 60.27 (2d ed. 1948)).
217. Sommers, 251 Minn. 461, 88 N.W.2d 191; Newman, 271 Minn. 514, 137
N.W.2d 181. “This is an appeal from an order of the municipal court of St. Paul
denying defendant’s motion to set aside a default judgment in favor of plaintiff
and to dismiss the action without prejudice . . . .” Sommers, 251 Minn. at 462, 88
N.W.2d at 192-93.
218. See, e.g., 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 60.44
(3d ed. 1997).
Despite the express language of the Rule, there is no real time limit of
any kind on a motion for relief from a void judgment. A motion under
Rule 60(b)(4) challenging a judgment as void is subject neither to the
‘reasonable’ time requirement of Rule 60(b) nor subject to the equitable
doctrine of laches, but rather may be made at any time.
Id. With the exception of the numbering scheme, Minnesota Rule 60.02 is
identical to the Federal Rule 60(b). See generally MINN. R. CIV. P. 60.02; FED. R. CIV.
P. 60(b).
219. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 867-68.
220. See Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., No. C3-96-100071 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
5th Dist. Aug. 31, 1998).
221. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 867-68.
222. Id.
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Bodes continue to be prohibited from utilizing a portion of their
223
farm.
V. VALIDITY: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
Admittedly, the favoring of validity over finality would initially
result in judicial inefficiency, as some judgments that had been
reached after a trial on the merits would be vacated. But this
burden would be worth it when balanced against the benefit of not
allowing courts to exceed their express authority. An oft-cited
maxim of the criminal law system provides a useful analogy: It is
better to allow 100 guilty men to go free than to imprison one
innocent man.
This inefficiency would likely be confined to a limited initial
period, as judges at all levels of the system would quickly recognize
the need to carefully scrutinize their jurisdictional bases. No judge
would want to hear an entire case on the merits, only to later vacate
its judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The tradition of
224
jurisdictional self-inquiry is strong in the federal court system,
and should be adopted by the Minnesota state courts when acting
in an appellate capacity.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Constitution grants the legislature express
authority to establish under what circumstances Minnesota courts
225
can hear appeals from agency decisions. In general, the district
226
courts have general jurisdiction,
but their jurisdiction was
223. Bode Interview, supra note 94. The author visited the Bode farm on July 7,
2001, and after walking the farm for over an hour, detected no difference between
the alleged “wetland” and the surrounding farmland. There was no standing water
visible, nor were there any muddy or moist areas. Apparently, water collects only
during the spring rainy reason and drains without the aid of any man-made
drainage system. Mr. Bode had installed the tile drainage system in 1981 only to
accelerate the drainage so that crops could be planted during the critical spring
planting season. Id.
224. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. When arguing before the U.S.
Supreme Court in the case of Bush v. Gore on December 11, 2000, then Presidentelect Bush’s attorney Theodore Olson had completed only three sentences of his
argument when Justice Stevens interrupted him by asking “Mr. Olson, can you
begin by telling us our federal jurisdiction, where is the federal question here?”
Bush v. Gore, Oral Argument, available at 2000 WL 1804429 (U.S. Oral Arg.).
225. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
226. Id.
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expressly limited by Minnesota Statute section 15.0424 when they
acted in an appellate capacity. This statute deprived the district
227
court the power to hear an appeal not filed within 30 days, or
228
within 33 days if the appeal was filed by mailing.
Through its decision in Bode, the Minnesota Supreme Court
effectively permitted the Rosenbloom district court to abuse its
229
authority and substantially infringe upon the authority of the
230
legislature to define and enact the applicable appeals period. As
the court continues to permit the lower courts to act without
231
subject matter jurisdiction, it is necessary for the State Legislature
to reassert its authority in this area. On February 15, 2001
232
Minnesota State Senator Stevens introduced S.F. No. 806 which
would amend Minnesota Statute 484.01 by adding the following
clause at the end of the current statute: “No district court shall have
appellate jurisdiction where an appeal is taken past the statutory
appeal period and any action of a district court without appellate
233
jurisdiction is void and may be vacated at any time.” In order for
this amendment to have broad prospective effect, this language
should also be made applicable to the Minnesota Court of
234
Appeals.
The Minnesota Legislature should pass and the Governor
should sign this legislation. It is unfortunate that such action is
necessary, but the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision of Bode v.
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources has left the legislature with
no choice but to expressly reassert its authority to establish the
appellate jurisdiction of Minnesota courts.

227. MINN. STAT. § 15.0424, subd. 1 (1980) (currently codified at MINN. STAT. §
14.63 (2000)).
228. See supra note 84.
229. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 612 N.W.2d 862, 871 (Minn. 2000)
(Page, J., dissenting).
230. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12(2) (1942).
231. See Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 213 (Minn. 2001) (holding
that the expiration of the time limits imposed by the Domestic Abuse Act, MINN.
STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 7(c) (2000), does not divest the district court of subject
matter jurisdiction to hold a hearing on a petition for an order for protection).
Justice Gilbert dissented from the Court’s opinion in Burkstrand, noting that the
use of the word “shall” in an unambiguous statute imposes a mandatory timing
requirement that should not be ignored, even on public policy grounds.
Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d at 214 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
232. S.F. 806, 2001-2002 Leg., 82nd Sess. (Minn. 2001).
233. Id.
234. See supra note 4 and statutes cited.

